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ABSTRACT
The issues of “race”, place and its connections to traditional and social media have never
been so signifcant. The riots that occurred in the UK in 2011 signalled a watershed moment
in  locating  virtual  networks  of  communication  to  heterogeneous  groups  which  resulted  in
autonomous social action. The purpose of this paper is to make intelligible the UK riots and
the complexities involved in binding together disparate groups of people together during a key
period of social unrest. It seeks to uncover these connections further to elucidate the ways in
which old and new technologies help to create virtual and ofine enclaves which transcend the
confnes  of  “race”,  class  and  gender.  The  methods  that  will  be  used  to  uncover  the
multifaceted responses to the riots will be multidisciplinary; it will involve an analysis of the
UK press at the height of the riots, secondary analysis of public sentiment and social media
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archives. These methods will result in a thematic analysis which posits the riots frmly within
the context of web 2.0’s hegemonic forces. Underlying these methods will be an interwoven
theoretical framework which supports the arguments presented. 
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RESUMEN
Las cuestiones de la “raza“, el lugar y sus conexiones con los medios de comunicación tra-
dicionales  y  medios  sociales  nunca  han  sido  tan  signifcativas.  Los  disturbios  que  se
produjeron en el Reino Unido en el 2011 marcaron un momento decisivo en la localización de
las redes virtuales de comunicación y los grupos heterogéneos que dieron lugar a la acción so -
cial autónoma. El propósito de este trabajo es entender los disturbios en el Reino Unido y las
complejidades implicadas a la hora de vincular a grupos diversos de personas durante un pe -
ríodo clave de malestar social. Se trata de descubrir estas conexiones para dilucidar las formas
en que viejas y nuevas tecnologías colaboran en la creación de enclaves virtuales y ofine que
trascienden los límites de la “raza“, la clase y el género. Los métodos que utilizados  para des-
cubrir  las  formas  multifacéticas  de  las  respuestas  a  los  disturbios  serán  multidisciplinarios,
incluyen análisis de la prensa del Reino Unido en el momento de los disturbios , un análisis se -
cundario de la opinión pública y los archivos de los medios de comunicación social.  Estos
métodos se traducirá  en un análisis  temático que postula  con frmeza que los  disturbios se
ubican en el contexto de las fuerzas hegemónicas del web 2.0. Subyacente a estos métodos hay
un marco teórico entretejido que apoya los argumentos presentados .
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“The driver behaviourial change has been technology of this”
(Mason, 2012: 133)
The last decade and a half has seen information -“rich nations” increasing reliance on informa-
tion and communication which now runs on ever- changing platforms and formats. Patterns of
communication have been strengthened amongst activist and protesting groups, as information
and digital societies have diversifed the ways in which people communicate with each other
and seek forms of power and action. Demands for power and recognition have taken on new
levels of visibility through the use information and technology. Social struggles and political
opposition now efortlessly move between ofine and online channels to spread mobilizing dis -
course to anyone who has access to information and social media. The Internet in particular,
has not only become a fabric of our lives (Castells, 2001), but has been a key fuel in driving
contemporary social action and expressing new forms of agency.
The spectator’s alienation from and submission to the contemplated object (which is the
outcome of his unthinking activity) works like this: the more he contemplates, the less he
lives; the more readily he recognizes his own needs in the images of need proposed by the
dominant system, the less he understands his own existence and his own desires. The spec-
tacle’s externality with respect to the acting subject is demonstrated by the fact that the indi-
vidual’s own gestures are no longer his own, but rather those of someone else who represents
them to him. The spectator feels at home nowhere, for the spectacle is everywhere.
(Debord, 1999: 23)
The 2011 riots in the UK was one instance where the grip of the spectacle was challenged
through collective social action. Reacting against various forms of inequality, political dissatis-
faction,  alienation  and  deprivation,  groups  of  people  came  together  to  form  resistant
collectivities to challenge the dominant order in the UK. Motivations and reasons behind the
UK riots have been widely discussed (Lammy, 2012,  Winlow & Hall,  2012,  Moxon 2011,
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Murji & Neal, 2011, Bridges, 2012), but it is the greedy opportunism and criminalistic “some-
thing for nothing” and consumerism that  is  important  at  this  juncture.  Through marketing,
promotion, reproduction, the circulation and selling of commodities, the specticle, perpetually
creates  a  society  full  of  manufactured  wants  and  needs.  The  specaticle  does  not  however,
create access to capital for all to acquire those needs and wants. In this respect, through the
self-realization of the spectacle’s exclusive capitalist self-interest, the rioters some of who were
disqualifed consumers, acted on instant gratifcation and the seduction that the spectacle en-
courages.
What the riot means is that consumer ideology is so ubiquitous, so all-encompassing…. the
only danger being that the tense and unstable dynamic libidinal force at its core can occa-
sionally spill over into brief yet intense bouts of aimless social disorder.
(Winlow & Hall, 2011:485)
The rioters, especially those who acted out against political and social exclusion, challenged
the foundations of the spectacle by moving away from passivity and alienation towards mobil -
izing themselves against their realized injustices. The processes of mediation and motivation
were not uniformly experienced amongst all participants of the riots. As in the case in lived
experience, people exercise subjectivity in interpretation, and thus are impacted upon through
the lens of their individual histories, ideologies and understandings (Hall, 1996). This situated
knowledge and experience can therefore impact the way in which media messages are read
and how the spectacle impacts them. The modes of organization for these protesting groups
largely rested on the use of various forms of technology and social media which in themselves
challenged the spectacle’s stranglehold. The use of digital technologies in the UK riots demon-
strated  a  re-appropriation  of  media,  moving  it  away  from  the  dominant  media  spectacle
towards an alternative sphere in where people could engage, mobilize and organize (Castells,
2012, Mason 2012). 
This  kind of use of technology in collective action is  not  a  new phenomenon (Van de
Donk et al. 2004), but what is distinctive about the recent social unrests seen in the UK, Spain
and  Egypt,  is  the  multimodal  nature  of  networking  within  the  movements  themselves.  As
Manuel Castells argues, “it [social movements] includes social networks online and ofine, as
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well  as pre-existing social  networks formed during the actions of the movement” (Castells,
2012:221). 
The series of networks built and sustained during the UK riots consisted of ofine and on -
line networks within the protesting movement, networks with the Internet “blogosphere” and
networks with the mainstream media and society in general (Castells, 2012). These digital net -
works  ran  concurrently  with  mainstream  media  networks  and  allowed  those  who  actively
engaged in the events of the riots forms of explicit and implicit participation.
Using Lynne Hamill’s three features of digital technology (Hamill, 2005), it is evident that
the protesting and activist groups in the UK riots fully engaged with digital technologies in the
following ways: frst, these groups relied heavily on the use of information to exchange com-
munication and information. This use of information signalled the use of smartphone devices
which enabled multimedia commentaries on the riots in real-time. Second, information was
stored through digital devices ready to upload onto social media networks adding a backdrop
to the mainstream coverage of the riots.  Third,  because of the accessibility  of information,
footage from the riots  was easy to  transmit  and reproduce (for  instance,  via YouTube and
Twitter), thus spreading the word of the riots far and wide at an astonishing speed. 
In understanding the UK riots, it is imperative not only to examine the way in which tech-
nology was used, but also to interrogate how the media spectacle portrayed the rioters. It is in
this respect,  that the issues of “race” and the underclass cannot be ignored. Commentators
during  the  riots  including  Conservative  ministers  Kenneth  Clarke  and  Iain  Duncan  Smith,
chose to root the causes of the unrest on race, gang culture and the “feral” underclass. The
processes of creating racial dynamics during the riots occurred at four key moments during the
unrest.  First,  the prominent black broadcaster cited racial profling as being one of the key
causes of the riots calling it an “insurrection of a generation of poor, primarily, black people
from the  Caribbean and from Africa.”  (Howe,  2011).  Howe was  a  constant  feature  in  the
media during the riots and consistently related the unrest back to the struggles and inequalities
faced by black people. Second, gangs were blamed for the majority of the riots and looting in
London even though fgures showed that only 13% of those arrested in the riots were identi -
fed as gang members (Home Ofce, 2011). The use of the term “gangs” in talking about the
rioters may appear neutral, but it is a term which is usually projected through the lens of race
and ethnicity (Runnymede Trust, 2011). 
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Third,  the riots were sparked by the death of Mark Duggan – a black man shot  at the
hands  of  a  notoriously  White  UK  police  force  which  was  deemed  “insitutionally  racist”
(Parekh,  2000).  This  racial  (white  /  black)  and  power  /  powerless  dichotomy  created  a
racialized dynamic which favoured the subsequent reporting of the riots. Fourth, the historian
David Starkey’s now infamous comments that “whites have become black” in reference to the
rioters, decidedly positioned the riots (and subsequent criminality), within a racialized frame. 
Nonetheless, the causes of the UK riots were more complex than one or two causal factors.
Media and social commentators who defned the riots solely through the discourse of “race”
and  racism  confated  the  complexities  involved  into  a  neat  media-ready  sound  bite.  The
protests  and  subsequent  criminality  were  not  committed  by  one  uniform racial  group who
rioted and acted out for exactly the same reasons. The riots were not simply a black and white
issue: 
One of the other diferences between now and 30 years ago…. is that the riots are no
longer just a black-and-white story. It's a story that's complicated by all kinds of changes in
our cities and our communities. It's a story that's been complicated by the development of
political Islam in our communities.
(Gilroy, 2011)
Protest and riots such as those seen in the UK and Brazil stem from a crisis in basic living
conditions which make everyday existence unbearable. In the UK contributing factors have
been the Government cuts,1 rising unemployment, increased welfare dependence and growing
social exclusion. These kinds of movements can also be spurred on by a growing distrust in
political leaders and institutions (Younge, 2011). 
The blacks and the underclass (or chavs) were largely labelled as the driving forces behind
the riots and looting. The underclass, a much maligned and demonized “group”, are viewed
with  fear  and  loathing  in  UK  society  (Jones,  2012).  Class  as  with  race  remains  a  central
feature in structuring contemporary cultural practice in the UK (Bennett, 2009). The stereo-
1 Government cuts refers to the government’s defunding of civil-society institutions in order to balance the na-
tion’s books (Sennett & Sassen, 2001).
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typical  portrayal  of  the  underclass  in  the  majority  of  the  media,  is  one  which  is  wholly
negative,  anti-social,  criminal  and  immoral  in  behaviour.  Caricatures  of  Chavs  include
working-class people who wear sport-related clothing, are aggressive in manner, criminal, ob-
sessed with consumerism, lacking in taste and judgement (Bourdieu, 1986), poorly educated
and wholly welfare dependent (Jones, 2012). Chavs are a symptom of “broken Britain” and a
legacy of the iron-rule of the late Margaret Thatcher. The spate of “reality” TV programmes
(e.g.  Skint,  Jeremy Kyle)  actively encouraging and perpetuating negative stereotypes of  the
underclass together with the lack of diversity in portrayal serves to homogenize diferences as
stereotypes undoubtedly aim to do. 
Much in the same way as with ethnic minorities in the UK, the working class have become
another  marginalized ethnic  minority  whose  “concerns  were  understood solely  through the
prism of race” (Jones, 2012: 8). This intersection between race and class is no surprise as both
facets of identity and culture are inextricably linked. For instance, ethnic minorities in the UK
are twice as likely to be poor compared with white Britons. Ethnic minorities who achieve
higher educational qualifcations also they fail to get the same rewards as their white British
counterparts thus impacting income levels and possible status (JRK, 2007). Designations of
the white underclass, pejoratively known as Chavs are located at the bottom of UK society – a
socially constructed racial degeneration of the white race. 
One of the big difculties we have we disentangling race from class, given that….Blacks, in
particular, and ethnic minorities in general, are found disproportionately in the lower eco-
nomic strata.
(Jones, 1972: 441)
In actual fact the rioters in the UK were not just the alienated underclass or racially profled
blacks,  the riots  contained diverse people of all  races,  social  clases and genders protesting,
rioting and looting:
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In some ways, the racial and economic diversity of the rioters has made it harder for Bri -
tons to come to grips with why the riots erupted and why they were so ferce, sudden and
widespread.
(Westervelt, 2011)
Nonetheless, one way in which uniformity was seen during the riots, was the collective mobil -
ization of the rioters and protesters to be in same place -occupying the same space- at the very
same time. This tightness in organization took some efort and co-ordination. Older and newer
forms of media were crucial in helping to carry the storms of the riots beyond the peaceful
protests in Tottenham on 6th August 2011.
This essay, posits that “race” was not a key motivator of the 2011 riots, but was one of
many factors which caused the social unrest. The essay explores how the issue of “race” re -
mained frmly rooted in the media coverage of the riots and examines how the riots gathered
speed to connect multi-ethnic groups of people to carry out autonomous social action.
The Reasons for the Riots
Research by the Guardian and the LSE into the riots uncovered that the four main causes of
the riots were poverty (86%), policing (85%), government policy (80%) and unemployment
(79%) (Guardian, 2012). These four issues were not surprising, but if the riots were mainly
about “race” as some commentators argued, where did racism or racial tension come in this
research? According to the same study, racial tension was 13th on the list  of causes of the
riots. 
“WHITES BECOMING LIKE BLACKS”: THE RACIALIZATION OF THE RIOTERS
At the time of the riots, the historian, David Starkey blamed a “profound cultural change” and
the infuence of black culture in “whites becoming like blacks” (Guardian, 2011) as being part
of the cause for the riots. 
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But could the basis of the riots really be that black and white? 
Anyone observer at the time of the riots would be forgiven for subscribing to this linear way
of  thinking  given  the  content  shown  in  the  UK  media.  Black  youths  largely  in  hoodies
dominated  the  TV  screens  and  newspaper  front  pages  from  the  outset.  Prominent  black
spokespeople such as Howe and MPs Diane Abbott and David Lammy were consulted and ex-
gang members were interviewed creating a decidedly racialized backdrop. The concentrated
media focus on black individuals and black culture arguably created a sense that the riots were
a “black problem”. 
Although the rioters were from various backgrounds the media focused on black culture
specifcally and the media’s choice of spokespeople was signifcant.
(Runnymede Trust, 2011: 15).
Race and the subsequent racialization of the rioters became a focus for the media. A popular
analogy circulating on social media at the time was likening the rioters to Apes in the flm,
“The Rise of the Planet of the Apes”. The reference to “The Rise of the Planet of the Apes”,
acted as a fctional counter-position to the real-life struggles and protests in the UK amongst
diverse  groups.  Nonetheless,  the  metaphorical  comparison  which  appears  harmless  at  frst
glance, contains racist discourses, imagery and themes which are problematic. The comparison
of  the  rioters  to  Apes  gave  a  fgurative  nod  to  the  racist  historic  association  of  Apes  to
particular groups of people – black people. 
The real racial subtext is less overt and thus more pernicious. It is about the externalisation
of those seen as responsible for the riots, their portrayal as bestial and thus as expendable, ex-
tinguishable – necessarily and justifably so.
(Lentin, 2011)
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The  online  although  freeing  in  regards  corporeal  existence  through  its  disembodiment
capabilities (Donath, 1999, Nakamura, 2002), is increasingly becoming a site where embodied
race and racism is articulated openly and freely: 
Racism is disavowed in the public sphere but at the same time is proliferating within digital
spheres. You Tube and Twitter provide places where the open voice of racism is being articu-
lated and captured.
(Back, 2012)
The media portrayed the rioters as feral youth who were labelled as more than criminal, but
animalistic. In the same way, grafti scribbled on the walls of Debenhams, Clapham Junction
at the height of the riots echoes this animalistic theme:
The animal, the beast in some of us will always be stronger. Darwin was right & will al -
ways be right.
The “Folk Devil”  (Cohen,  1972) in this  storm was undoubtedly youths,  in  particular  black
youths, but this can be narrowed down even further to - black male youths. The spectacle of
the other left many black males feeling victimized and stereotyped. Many black males ques -
tioned at  the  time,  believed that  the  media  had  racialized  the  riots  and  by  representation,
refocused  sharp  attention  on  the  politics  of  criminality  and  its  stereotypical  connection  to
black males. 
Substantiating the “racialized” dimension of the riots, British teacher and writer, Katharine
Birbalsingh (Telegraph, 2011a) asked the public not to ignore the “fact” that the riots were
about  race.  Birbalsingh  felt  vindicated  in  her  racialized  claims  because  her  instincts  were
correct that “black youths would once again set London alight” (as if black youths were and
are pre-destined to do so). 
Elsewhere in the media, the BNP led with an article titled “London Burning after Three
Days of Race Riots” (BNP, 2011) – many other media oferings at the time, would constantly
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draw parallels between previous “race” riots to qualify the unequal focus on the racial dimen -
sions of the riots. 
Duggan, the man now synonymous with the UK riots was instantly raced – he was not the
default “race” of white in mainstream UK consciousness. As a result, the reporting of subse -
quent events had a distinctly racialized hue. 
Adding  more  weight  to  this  argument  was  Starkey  who  argued  on  BBC2’s  Newsnight
(2011) that:
A particular sort of violent, destructive, nihilistic gangster culture has become fashion and
the black and white, boy and girl, operate in this language together.
And
The whites have become black. This language which is wholly false, which is this Jamaican
patois that’s intruded in England, and this is why so many of us have this sense of literally a
foreign country.
Starkey then attempted to dilute his comments with interesting concluding remarks: 
“It’s not skin colour it’s cultural.”
Starkey’s comments at the time, together with the media spectacle, rooted the riots within a ra-
cialized  frame.  If  Starkey  had actually  believed that  the riots  had nothing to  do with  skin
colour, why mention that white skinned people had become like black people? 
The choice of the word “intrude” was also interesting. It implied that the presence of Ja -
maicans and the Patois dialect had violated the purity of Englishness – whatever “Englishness”
might be. Starkey would have been far less controversial commenting on the socio-economic
characteristics of the rioters or on the particularity of the neighbourhoods where the distur -
bances occurred.
Starkey’s  reductionist  and  over-simplifed remarks  implied  that  that  some  black  groups
were and are inherently prone to criminal and violent behaviour. His comments also suggested
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that white and black people are poles apart culturally. In this respect, Jamaicans’ and their cul -
ture  had  negatively  afected  or  contaminated  England  and  “whiteness”  –  thus,  marking
diference. 
Symbolic boundaries are central to all culture. Marking “diference” leads us, symbolically,
to close ranks, shore up culture and to stigmatize and expel anything which is defned as im-
pure, abnormal. However, paradoxically, it also makes “diference” powerful, strangely at-
tractive precisely because it is forbidden, taboo, threatening to cultural order.
(Hall, 1997: 237)
Following public complaints,  Starkey back-tracked on his comments made on Newsnight by
making a distinction between diferent types of blacks and whites (Telegraph, 2011b): “At the
top, successful blacks, like (MPs) David Lammy and Diane Abbott have merged efortlessly
into what continues to be a largely white elite...”
This racial distinction was telling, Lammy and Abbott could simply be politicians at the
top of their career – they had to be “raced” frst and foremost. Politicians such as Tessa Jowell,
David Cameron and Francis Maude are never viewed in “racialized” terms. More often than
not, whiteness is not “raced” unless it is seen in the context of people who are viewed as dis -
tinctly  diferent  to  the  norm,  as  Starkey’s  subsequent  comments  demonstrate  (Telegraph,
2011b): “At the bottom of the heap, the story of integration is the opposite: it is the white
lumpen proletariat, cruelly known as the 'chavs', who have integrated into the pervasive black
'gangsta' culture.”
Chavs or the white lumpen proletariat as Starkey also calls them is equal in status to black
“gangsta” culture. The important issues to raise are - what exactly is black “gangsta” culture?
And what constitutes black “gangsta-dom”? For instance, is it a black person with gold teeth?
Black people who wear hoodies? A black person in a gang? Black people who listen to rap
music? Black people who are involved in criminal behaviour? The concept is subjective and its
associations are socially constructed.
Figures from the Ministry of Justice (2012) clearly showed that those accused of rioting
were predominately male (89%). The rioters were mainly young and lacking in education with
over half of those appearing in court aged 20 or under (27% were aged 10 to 17). Of those
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aged 10 to 17, 42% appearing in court were on free school meals and 64% of 10-17 year-olds
lived in one of the 20% most deprived areas. Two-thirds of the young people who appeared in
court in connection with the riots were classed as having some form of special educational
need, compared with 21% for the national average. More than a third of young people who
were involved in the riots had been excluded from school during 2009-10. 
According to Ministry of Justice (2012) statistics in London, 33% of those appearing in
the courts on riot-related charges were white and 46% were black. The fgures varied by place
but also refected the diferent ethnic breakdowns of the cities where the riots happened. For
instance, in London, 33% of defendants were white, in Liverpool, the fgure was 79%.
The statistics indicated that the riots were not simply about “race” or racism. They also
amounted to be more than a simple response to the shooting of Mark Duggan. In areas such as
Salford where the population under 40 is 88% white and 2% black or mixed, we ought, if the
riots were solely about “race”, to have seen very little or no white presence. In actual fact,
94% of the defendants that appeared in courts on riot-related charges were white. Similarly, in
Liverpool, 73% of the defendants were white and 13% were from the black ethnic group. It is
clear then that the riots were a multi-ethnic afair, mainly carried out by the young. 
Social Media and the Riots
Communicative exchange amongst young people largely consists of digital technology, in the
form of mobile phones and the Internet.  In  the UK riots,  communicating through diferent
platforms was crucial in keeping people up-to-date with what was happening in the riots. In
this respect, one of the pivotal ways in which communication was maintained and mobilization
was built was through the use of mobile and Internet-based technologies. 
As was seen in the case of the Arab Spring and in Greece, social media networking has in
some part, played a role in various social movements. Mobile and Internet technologies helped
to spread the word and encouraged collective mobilization in much the same as traditional ra -
llies, petitions and television have done in the past. The main diference now is communication
and exchange can be conducted in real time. This temporal aspect heightened the immediacy
of the riots and added an increased feeling of interactivity and exchange between the people
talking about the riots on social media via their mobile phones and the Internet.
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The  use  of  social  media  during  the  UK  riots  created  an  interconnectivity  which  has
seldom, if ever, been seen in the UK. The UK, a largely information-rich country, has seen a
growing consumption in social media which mirrors the way many of us live our lives now.
We are increasingly mobile and connected – with one eye on what we have to do and another
eye on our smartphones and tablets. We can be here, there and everywhere at the very same
time with the use of these devices. Space, place and time have no boundaries - as was seen in
the case of the riots. 
The  majority  of  rioters  and  looters  were  young  in  age  with  over  half  of  those  who
appeared in court aged 20 and under. The communication method of choice for this age group
according to Ofcom’s “The Communication Market” 2012 report is the smartphone. The same
report also suggests that the adolescents’ smartphone of choice is the BlackBerry. 
It  was therefore unsurprising that the BlackBerry smartphone and its messaging service
(BBM) played a key role in spreading the word of the riots. BBM technology ofers a complete
and safe  up-to-the minute  commentary  service  to  networks  of  BlackBerry  contacts  in  real
time. Unlike Twitter and Facebook, BlackBerry Messenger is  a covert social network – the
messages sent are encrypted during transmission. Both Twitter and Facebook are traceable by
authorities, which was one of the reasons why arrests during the riots were quickly made on
intelligence from these platforms on the grounds of social media misuse. 
Although, Twitter and Facebook played subsidiary roles in the UK riots, all three social
media platforms combined ofered rioters with a way to instantly communicate and interact
with each other within the faceless fows of social media. They also ofered a way for people
to post pictures of real-time action and upload videos of the activities as and when they occu -
rred.  Social  media  messaging allowed details  of  the riots to  spread online and ofine.  The
capabilities of social media messaging acted as an alternative media outlet for rioters which
ran parallel to the mainstream media. Mainstream media outlets, such as the BBC and ITV
found themselves at least, two steps behind the rioters and protestors. 
The range of social media platforms used ofered a defensive social media enclave where
the convergence of disparate groups of people took place. This enclave then mobilized itself,
bringing about social action largely on the groups’  own terms.  Some of the reasons for this
mobilization have already been stated, such as unemployment levels and policing, but social
media was the key factor in bringing these groups of people together. Social media helped to
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fuel the fres of anger and frustration beyond the private sphere into direct action presented in
the public domain. 
The anger and frustration felt by some during the riots added to the overwhelming atmos-
phere of discontent that was and is still experienced in certain areas in the UK. During the
riots, a strange sense of suspense lingered in the air in the UK. This was certainly felt in the
neighbourhoods of Battersea and Clapham Junction. For instance, Clapham Junction, usually a
well-kept and clean area, turned into a littered wasteland – with empty laptop and Flatscreen
TV boxes  discarded  on  the  streets,  shelves  in  supermarkets  bare,  shop  fronts  boarded  up,
smashed bus shelters, youths circling people on bikes, men walking around vacantly with bare
feet  (presumably because their  trainers were stolen) and burning buildings. There was very
little police presence at the time which heightened the total sense of lawlessness experienced
by people in Clapham Junction and other parts of the UK. 
The youths in particular, certainly the ones personally witnessed, had an air about them -
an attitude of nothing ventured, nothing gained. The youths of various races, looked as though
had nothing to lose, no stake in society. There was a genuine mismatch between the accepted
norms and values of society and the rioters’ own newly displayed values and actions. These
groups did not appear to be disguising their identities or wearing gloves or even looking out
for  a  police  presence.  It  was  almost  as  if  the  autonomy  and  freedom  granted  by  online
planning  (particularly,  through  BBM),  added  to  their  overall  confdence.  The  online
planning/exchange and ofine mobilization/action, served for that short period of time to give
these youths  a  stake in  society (albeit  illicit  and misguided).  For  those few days,  arguably
these groups had the power and as such, felt a sense of recognition. Technology, undoubtedly,
was central to creating feeling.
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A Politics of Recognition 
Social media messaging with a particular emphasis on BBM, was used as a vehicle of recogni -
tion2 and  created  forms  of  empowerment  through  its  use  as  an  informed  citizen  taking
ownership of one’s situation: 
Empowerment can imply actively subverting existing levels of expertise, taking ownership
of particular problems, gaining access to the creation of knowledge.
(Galusky, 2003: 197)
The processes of communication during the riots shifted seamlessly between the fows of In-
ternet, mobile phone based planning and ofine action. The technology available to the rioters
was used in a way to create recognition to get their voices heard,  to record events as they
happened and to create an account of reactions to their own lived experiences in real time. The
use of social media messaging reclaimed power from the spectacle in regards to the politics of
who represents whom, in what way and to what efect. 
Nonetheless, given some of the illicit activities surrounding the riots, the politics of repre -
sentation (especially of the looting) served mostly to amplify and support the negative public
perceptions of these youthful  rioters.  Notwithstanding this,  in examining the UK riots,  it  is
still  important  to  acknowledge  the  enterprising  eforts  made  by  people  who  recorded  the
events and shared them with their social media circles and mainstream media. 
Much in the same way as sociology has sought not to condone or excuse the riots, but to
explain and understand them; social media messaging cannot be solely blamed for the events
that took place. Social media messaging can be used in a range of ways both for good or bad
purposes. Social media messaging was an outlet used to express anger and opinion not only in
relation to authorities and politicians, but also in regards to condemning the actions of the rio -
ters. As a platform it situated itself as an appendage to events “telling it how it was” alongside
2 The use of the term recognition is framed within the context of groups organizing themselves into self-em -
powering collectives to carry out action which results in a form of recognition (cf. Taylor, 1994).
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mainstream  media.  This  politics  of  representation  added  freedom  to  the  acts  committed
(through disembodied planning)  and to  the dissemination  of  its  reporting (on social  media
networks). 
Youths recorded and uploaded footage from the events – sometimes adding commentary,
captions to pictures and music as a backdrop, which allowed for a real-time digital exchange of
ideas and comments. Indeed, to access the heart of the riots, the mainstream media had to re-
linquish power to those who were part of the riots themselves. This inter-textual exchange saw
those who were flming, taking pictures, rioting and looting getting their footage and commen-
tary  heard  by  the  masses  (albeit  edited  by  reporters  for  mainstream  consumption  and
condemnation). 
Overall, the acts seen in the riots would have sufced to give these groups a politics of
recognition, but through the use of social media messaging, the groups gained recognition th -
rough their own self-representation. BlackBerry Messenger with its closed servers was a digital
enclave that law enforcers could not penetrate. Through the use of Twitter, BBM and Face -
book, rioters and their supporters arguably felt a sense of recognition of their plight against
hegemonic forces. The speed, accessibility and popularity of social media messaging during
the UK riots provided a sense of one-upmanship over the police and other dominant institu-
tions. 
The social media capital3 ofered a freedom of expression and a space for solidarity which
allowed individuals to come together to form collective forces. The currency in these riots was
“social media capital” and was demonstrated in three distinct ways. 
First, the rioters and their supporters had to have access to the tools of communication.
Accessing the Internet and social media was quite easy and simple as Internet subscriptions at
the time were relatively cheap to obtain and most social media sites were free to join. In this
respect, the prospect of a digital or social media divide was limited thus allowing those who
wished to participate in social media exchange during the riots, the appropriate capital to do
so. 
Second, an understanding of how to use social media efectively was important in ensuring
that  key  information  was  communicated  and  exchanged.  This  component  of  social  media
3 The use of Capital as used here, can be viewed as a resource or currency obtained and required in specifc
contexts.
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capital can include - understanding how to create groups, share pages on Facebook, write and
send tweets, embed links within social media messages, upload images, comment on photos,
set up privacy settings, set up BlackBerry Messenger, add friends onto the BlackBerry Me-
ssenger etc. – the list of social media expertise is currently endless. Setting up forms of social
media exchange would not be straightforward unless capital was acquired to know what to do
in the social media space. 
Third, once access and knowledge was obtained, social media capital by way of having a
group  of  followers  on  Twitter,  “friends”  on  Facebook  and BlackBerry  Messenger  contacts
were crucial in completing the social media capital “cycle” required to fully participate in the
social media dimension of the riots. For instance, to send Twitter messages – but to have no
followers or having BlackBerry Messenger, knowing how to use it - but having no contacts
would have been a block to the massive potential of social media networking and its interac-
tive logic in spreading the word about the riots. 
Moving this argument beyond online exchange towards collective action, social media ca-
pital enthusiasts during the riots would have had to take this capital with them into the ofine
space. They would have needed to act on intelligence gained from their social media capital to
carry out collective mobilization and action.
It is important to stress here, that social media capital can obtained from the frst and se -
cond  stages  combined.  The  third  stage  would  be  dependent  on  how infuential  a  person’s
network of social media friends or followers were in allowing the information about the UK
riots to spread. It would also be dependent on the willingness of the receiver to have acted on
the intelligence gained.
In conclusion, it is beyond the scope of this essay to examine the host of reasons why the
riots took place. The media’s role in creating ready-made racialized “folk devils” in its cove-
rage of the riots served only to support stereotypes. The causes of the riots were not just an
issue pertaining to “race” as some commentators have tried to argue. Various factors such as
widespread poverty, powerlessness and wanton opportunism felt by sections of society, led in -
dividuals, many of them young and poor to come together to form autonomous and dynamic
collectives. Social media played its role in spreading the word. It created immaterial linkages
between  individuals  which  moved  beyond  Internet  and  mobile  platforms  into  real  and
meaningful ofine and embodied action. The use of social media capital was central to fanning
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the fames of the UK riots. Social media granted rioters with the possibilities of anonymity
and mobility in communicative exchange which boosted the levels of recognition for plights of
the rioters. 
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